Twenty-eight months after the onset of the global financial crisis of August 2008, the evidence on post-crisis GDP growth emerging from a sample of 51 advanced and emerging countries is flattering for inflation targeting countries relative to their peers. The positive effect of IT is not explained away by plausible pre-crisis determinants of post-crisis performance, such as growth in private credit, ratios of short-term debt to GDP, reserves to short-term debt and reserves to GDP, capital account restrictions, total capital inflows, trade openness, current account balance and exchange rate flexibility, or post-crisis drivers such as the growth performance of trading partners and changes in terms of trade. We find that inflation targeting countries lowered nominal and real interest rates more sharply than other countries; were less likely to face deflation scares; and had sharp real depreciations without a relative deterioration in their risk assessment by markets. While the task of establishing causal relationships from cross-sectional macroeconomics series is daunting, our reading of this evidence is consistent with the resilience of IT countries being related to their ability to loosen their monetary policy when most needed, thereby avoiding deflation scares and the zero lower bound on interest rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two years into the Great Recession, the evidence on post-crisis GDP growth is flattering for inflation targeting countries. Namely, for a sample of 51 advanced and emerging countries, inflation targeting (and flexible exchange rate regime) countries have fared better than their peers in terms of post-crisis GDP growth ( Figure 1 ) or industrial production ( Figure 2 ). Given the record during the Great Moderation years, that is a rather surprising result; for instance, the literature recently reviewed by Ball (2010) finds only weak effects for inflation targeting.
The first step of this paper's argument is to demonstrate that IT countries have indeed fared better than their peers during the Great Recession. That is the easy part. In our sample of 51 countries, IT countries dominate the ranks of the top performers while keeping mostly away from the lower performance rungs. That is true for post-crisis growth in absolute terms and also relative to pre-crisis growth trends. It is also true for a measure of output loss since the crisis (Table 1) .
Then in its second step, this paper shows that the positive effect of IT is not explained away by plausible pre-crisis determinants of economic performance, such as growth in private credit, ratios of short-term debt to GDP, reserves to short-term debt and reserves to GDP, capital account restrictions, total capital inflows, trade openness, current account balance and exchange rate flexibility, or post-crisis drivers such as the growth performance of trading partners and changes in terms of trade.
Finally I examine the plausibility of different channels through which differences in monetary policy affected post-crisis outcomes for IT and not-IT countries. First, in the face of deflationary shocks, a credible inflation target may play an important role at avoiding a liquidity trap and the perils of the zero lower bound on interest rates (e.g. Decressin and Laxton 2009 ). This has been underscored by the communication strategy of some IT central banks. In the words of Governor Carney of the Bank of Canada: "Just as inflation targeting has proven its ability to prevent the entrenchment of high and volatile inflation, it also has the power to prevent the onset of persistent deflation." 1 Bernanke (1999) also argued that Japan could have avoided its late 1990s deflationary pressures had it had put in place a formal inflation targeting framework before those pressures arose. Second, credible IT frameworks may also allow IT adopters to pursue a more aggressive course of monetary policy easing without compromising their inflation outlooks than otherwise. That is particularly relevant for emerging market IT adopters as they are typically more volatile and vulnerable to inflationary risks than their advanced country counterparts (e.g. Ghosh and others, 2009 ). Third, it is plausible that during periods of global booms and easy money (say, because U.S. monetary policy is loose), the pursuit of an inflation target may push central banks towards leaning against the wind more than otherwise either in order to reach the inflation target or because exchange rate flexibility limits capital inflows. Indeed, IT countries had higher nominal and real interest rates during the expansion phase prior to the current crisis. The tight monetary stance of IT countries during the build-up to the crisis may have mitigated lending booms or reduced the attractiveness of high-yield foreign assets of dubious quality such as U.S. subprime mortgage to their own financial systems, thereby somewhat insulating them from the subsequent downfall. Moreover, in the event of a sudden crisis, countries with higher nominal interest rates have more room for rate cuts and therefore less need for costly extraordinary fiscal measures.
Fourth, there is a significant correlation between inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate regimes. Flexible exchange rates have long been recognized in the literature as shock-absorbers (e.g. Broda, 2004; Edwards and Levy Yeyati, 2005; Mendoza 1995 ) and may be a factor boosting the relative performance of IT countries.
We find that inflation targeting countries lowered nominal and real interest rates more sharply than other countries; were less likely to face deflation scares; and had sharp real depreciations without a relative deterioration in their risk assessment by markets. While the task of establishing causal relationships from cross-sectional macroeconomics series is daunting, our reading of this evidence is consistent with the resilience of IT countries being related to their ability to loosen their monetary policy when most needed, thereby avoiding deflation scares and the zero lower bound on interest rates.
This contribution belies the views of some IT skeptics who have advocated scrapping that monetary policy regime as an anachronistic relic of the Great Moderation. Inflation targeting has been the target of pointed criticism: its narrow focus on inflation may blind central bankers from other worthwhile objectives such as reducing unemployment (e.g. Stiglitz 2008 ); IT central banks may also lose sight of important determinants of financial stability as they narrowed their intellectual pursuits and attention to matters related to meeting their narrow goals (Buiter 2009 ); and IT regimes, usually implemented under flexible exchange rate regimes, may suffer from destabilizing exchange rate movements when the private or public sector liabilities are dollarized (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . 2 2 Hungary tried to have an exchange rate target whilst it operated an inflation targeting framework, but it abandoned their narrower exchange rate target after 2004 and its wider +/-15 percent target was abandoned in February 2008 (Stone and others, 2009, pp. 43-45) . Chile and Israel also dropped exchange rate stabilization because it came into conflict with IT.
This contribution is also novel as the established empirical research on the advantages and pitfalls of inflation targeting (e.g. Ball and Sheridan, 2005; Batini, Kuttner and Laxton, 2005; Batini and Laxton, 2007; Gonçalves and Salles, 2008; Brito and Bystedt, 2009; Ball 2010) has focused on the Great Moderation years and on inflation and output outcomes over several years, instead of the response to specific global shocks and the policy challenges they ensue. But arguably this is the first major global shock since the relatively broad dissemination of inflation targeting regimes.
II. SAMPLE SELECTION
To compare the performance of IT and non-IT countries during the crisis, I use simple econometric frameworks on a balanced panel data set of macroeconomic variables by countries.
I assign IT to all the countries that have adopted IT before the financial crisis, even if they had not adopted IT yet at some earlier period covered by the sample. The choice of sample is crucial to the credibility of this exercise. I used a size cutoff of USD 10 billion for the 2002 nominal GDP in dollars, because small poor developing countries typically do not have the institutional capability for inflation targeting, so they would not be an appropriate comparison group for IT countries.
Then I further selected countries based on data availability. The data availability cutoff refers to monthly data availability on the unemployment rate, industrial production, policy interest rate and the sovereign 5-year CDS spread -I only consider in the analysis countries for which three of those variables are available. While data availability is a practical concern from the point of view of the researcher, it is fair to say that there is an economic justification for excluding countries for which data availability is limited, as monetary policy in an inflation targeting framework requires a certain degree of sophistication of national economic statistics (see the collection of papers compiled by Carson, Enoch and Dziobek 2002) .
The combination of the size and data availability criteria selects 52 countries for our sample, of which 23 are inflation targeters. From an initial full sample of 160 countries, 88 are excluded for not meeting both the size and the data availability criteria; 18 countries for not meeting the data availability criterion despite meeting the size criterion; and 4 are excluded for not meeting the size criterion despite availability of data.
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In the regressions, the sample is reduced to 51, because observations for the United States are dropped on the account that the crisis originated on that country and this paper intends to determine whether IT was a relevant determinant of performance in the aftermath of that exogenous shock.
The chart below illustrates how similar those two groups of countries are in terms of economy size and per capita output levels. A test of means shows that non-IT countries have higher per capita GDP in PPP terms, and are on average larger economies than IT countries in our sample (Table 2) . Table 2 also documents the pre-crisis similarities and differences between IT and non-IT countries in our sample. While there were no statistically significant differences in inflation rates, credit default swap premia, changes in real exchange rates, inflation forecasts, unemployment rates, and the level and composition of growth before the crisis, IT countries stood out for higher policy interest rates, either in nominal or in real terms (real interest rates are calculated using Consensus Forecasts expectations of inflation) -in our sample, real interest rates in August 2008 were almost 3 percentage points higher in IT countries than elsewhere, and no IT country in our sample had negative real interest rates in August 2008 while non-IT countries had negative real interest rates on average. 
III. RESULTS
A. Were Inflation Targeting countries more resilient during the crisis?
The first question I ask is whether IT countries fared better in the aftermath of the crisis than their peers. In a simple comparison of median cumulative GDP and industrial production growth rates for IT countries and their peers, it is clear that IT countries rebounded earlier (Figures 1 and 2 ). The challenge of comparing median or mean growth rates for two groups after the crisis is to establish a counterfactual that would have occurred without the crisis. I estimate the effect of IT after the crisis in a panel data setting with country-and time-fixed effects, allowing for heteroskedastic and seriallycorrelated errors. Hence in the equation (1) 
The variable AFTER denotes after the crisis (i.e. it is equal to one from 2008Q4 onwards) and the sample starts in 2006Q1. Table 3 reports the point estimates of the IT effect and confidence intervals based on block bootstrap clustered by (loosely defined) regions. 4 When the left-hand side variable is real GDP, the coefficient on the interaction between the dummies for after the crisis and inflation targeting is positive and economically significant. It is interesting to know whether this result is driven by advanced economies or emerging markets, so in the next column I introduce interactions with indicators of advanced and emerging economies (while controlling for differential trends for each group of countries), and find that the IT effect on post-crisis real GDP levels appears to be driven by the performance of advanced economies, but I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for emerging and advanced economies. The next step is to examine the timing of when IT made a difference: when I estimate the effect on each quarter after the crisis (column 3), it is clear that IT countries pulled ahead as early after the crisis as the first quarter of 2009. After denotes the period since 2008Q4. Shaded cells denote statistical significance at 5% level. Confidence intervals are based on the 5 and 95 percentiles of the block bootstrap distribution of the parameters and are reported in square brackets. The block bootstrap is clustered by regions (details about the region classification are in the Data Appendix), and each block had data for 6 consecutive quarters.
There is a great coincidence between inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate regime for the sample in this paper.
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Based on the country classifications in 2007, only 2 countries in our sample are classified as floaters and have not adopted IT (Japan and Singapore); while only 3 countries are classified as IT but their de facto exchange regime cannot be described as floater (Czech Republic, Peru, Philippines). Therefore it is a daunting task to take apart the effects of inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility in the data. Nonetheless, despite the almost perfect coincidence between inflation targeting regimes and floating exchange rates, I cannot reject the hypothesis that a floating exchange rate regime before the crisis was uncorrelated with GDP performance after August 2008 (column 4).
For the growth rate (relative to the previous quarter), the IT coefficient is very close to zero (column 5); and when I estimate the effect on each quarter after the crisis, I find that the bulk of the difference between IT and other countries can be laid on the early recovery or shallower plunge by IT countries in 2009Q2, but confidence intervals are very wide so any conclusion on this matter is very tentative.
Looking into other measures of economic activity, the results are mixed. For industrial production as the dependent variable, I find an even larger coefficient of the interaction between IT and after the crisis (column 7); while for unemployment rate, I find no significant effect (column 8).
B. Was it inflation targeting or something else?
Monetary and exchange rate regimes are not always determined by historical accidents, but may be each country's choice based on the characteristics of the risks facing their economy. For concreteness, it is possible that IT countries are exposed to common risk factors driving their performance. If that is true, IT and other exchange rate regimes are not allocated randomly and differences in the performance of IT and non-IT countries in any event may reflect other underlying factors. It is therefore interesting to examine if our finding of greater resilience of IT countries during and after the great financial crisis should be considered a feature of IT or not. That is a issue of causal identification-and those questions are often intractable in macroeconomics. However we can learn about the mechanism that caused IT countries to perform better since 2008Q3 by verifying 5 I use a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) , defining "floater" as the union of the following classifications: pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%; de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%; moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time); managed floating; and freely floating.
if the IT effect has explanatory power over and beyond other factors identified in the literature as relevant explanatory variables for the economic contraction in the current crisis.
The existing literature on the determinants of contractions in the current crisis (e.g. Berkmen and others 2009; Blanchard and Faruqee 2010; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010; Tsangarides 2010; Llaudes, Salman and Chivakul 2010) has indicated some variables (measured before the crisis) that are correlated to GDP contractions in the global financial crisis of 2008, such as the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP, the degree of openness to trade, the change in the commodity terms of trade, the change in private credit to GDP, the pre-crisis current account balance, and the average GDP growth of trading partners. 6 For each one of those factors, I run a regression of the post-crisis change in growth rates since the crisis (which I call 'growth acceleration') on a wide array of factors identified in the literature as determinants of exposure to financial crisis in general or this crisis in particular. I define the variable growth acceleration as the difference between the growth rate in the post-crisis period (from the second semester of 2008 to the first semester of 2010) and the annual growth rate in the five years period ending in the first semester of 2008. Table 4 and Figure 3 report the value of this variable for each one of the 52 countries in the sample. The results are thus reported in Table 5 . In column 1, I report a positive and statistically significant relation between IT and growth acceleration (change in GDP growth rate since the crisis), for a sample of 51 advanced and nonadvanced countries. In column 2, I split the sample and find that this finding holds for both advanced and not-advanced countries, but I find a larger point estimate for not-advanced countries. Red bars denote inflation targeting countries. In column 3, I focus on non-advanced countries and replicate a result previously presented by Blanchard and Faruqee (2010) that short-term external debt was an important risk factor for GDP contractions in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis: an additional 10 percentage points of GDP of short-term external debt in 2007 implies on average a 3.0 percent reduction in annual growth rates since the crisis. 8 Including a control for the pre-crisis ratio of short-term external debt to GDP does not affect the statistical or economic significance of the IT variable (Figure 4 ). In column 5, I combine the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP and reserves to short-term external debt. Both variables are significant and maintain their sign, and so does the IT variable.
In column 6, I control for the pre-crisis ratio of reserves to GDP. That variable is not statistically significant and does not affect the coefficient on the IT variable ( Figure 6 ). In column 7, I control for the pre-crisis ratio of gross public debt to GDP. Surprisingly, there is a significant positive relationship between pre-crisis public debt levels and post-crisis growth performance. While this result is hard to rationalize, it does not change the statistical or economic significance of the IT effect (Figure 7 ). The geographical dispersion of pre-crisis capital account restrictions does not seem to have a relationship with the post-crisis performance. The Quinn index of capital account restrictions is not significantly related to post-crisis performance after one controls for IT and advanced country dummies. Moreover, the effect of IT is robust to inclusion of that measure of capital account restrictions (column 8). Similar results are found for measures of actual capital inflows (the ratio of total capital inflows to GDP for 2006Q1-2007Q2, in column 9, Figure 8 ) and actual trade flows (average trade in goods and services to GDP, 2003 GDP, -2007 , in column 10, Figure 9 ).
In column 11, I introduce changes in the commodity terms of trade to the specification. That variable enters with the expected positive coefficient and is strongly significant. Interestingly, its introduction reduces the effect of IT, which may be explained by IT countries on average having faced more favorable terms of trade shocks than other countries since the crisis (Figure 10 ). In column 12, I find that the coefficient of inflation targeting is also robust to including a measure of credit booms, the change in the ratio of private credit to GDP in the years before the crisis (Figure 11 ).
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The current account balance is another determinant of post-crisis performance recognized in the literature (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2010) . In column 13, the results show the coefficient of inflation targeting is also robust to including the average pre-crisis current account balance (Figure 12 ). 
Growth acceleration
For the sample of countries in this paper, there is a high correlation between inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility. Thus it is interesting to verify if the coefficient of inflation targeting is robust to inclusion of measures of exchange rate flexibility. The inclusion of the 2003-2007 volatility of real effective exchange rates (column 14) and dummies for de facto exchange rate pegs and the euro area (column 15) does not add explanatory power and causes little change to the IT coefficient.
Finally, post-crisis performance was probably influenced by 'neighborhood effects', or the performance of trading partners. In column 8, I find a positive but not significant effect of trading partners' growth acceleration and introduction of that variable does not change the finding of a positive coefficient of IT on change in growth since the crisis (Figure 13 ). 
C. Robustness to different sub-samples
This paper has focused on a selection of advanced and emerging countries that is not representative of the universe of countries in the world. Thus I show on Table  6 the effect of changes in the composition of the sample on our results.
In the first column of Table 6 , I reproduce the result in the first column of Table 5 . The main result of an economically significant outperformance of IT countries in terms of change in growth rates since the crisis holds up for subsamples excluding the 12 Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain); the 3 oil exporters (Norway, Russian Federation and Venezuela); the 9 Eastern European countries (Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine), the 6 Emerging Asian countries (China,P.R.: Mainland, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand); or the 7 Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela)
We also undertake a procedure proposed by Hadi (1992) to identify outliers in the sample, and re-run the regressions with a "clean" data set. That procedure tells us to exclude Ukraine, which does not change our main result. 
D. Are the results robust to extending the sample to other emerging countries?
In a recent working paper, Tsangarides (2010) finds that among emerging market economies, the growth performance for countries adopting a peg was not different from that of countries with a floating exchange rate during the crisis, after controlling for regime switches during the crisis, using alternative definitions for pegs, and taking into account other growth determinants. Since there is a strong correlation between IT and not having a peg in both my sample of advanced and emerging countries and Tsangarides' sample of emerging countries, it is worthwhile to verify how the results in this paper can be extended to Tsangarides' dataset or how Tsangarides' result holds in this paper's sample.
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In Table 7 , the left-hand side variable is the difference between the annualized post-crisis (2008/09) and pre-crisis (2003/08) growth rates -we have to do that to incorporate all the countries in Tsangarides (2010) , as some emerging countries in his sample do not have quarterly GDP data. The results show that the IT effect cannot be detected in the Tsangarides' sample of 50 emerging markets (column 1); and that adding the Tsangarides countries to our sample renders the coefficient on inflation targeting statistically insignificant (column 2). It is also the case that the failure to detect the IT effect in the Tsangarides' specification is caused by the differences in the sample, as the IT coefficient is statistically significant when the Tsangarides specification is estimated in the 51 countries sample of this paper (column 3). Finally, when I substitute an indicator for countries that do not peg for the inflation targeting dummy, the coefficient is positive, but not statistically significant (column 4). 
E. Bayesian model averaging
Summing up the results thus far, IT countries seem to have fared better than non-IT countries, in terms of the change in their growth rates since the crisis. This finding is robust to controlling for other important determinants of post-crisis performance, such as post-crisis economic performance of trading partners and changes in terms of trade, and pre-crisis ratios of short-term external debt to GDP, reserves to short-term external debt and reserves to GDP, capital account restrictions, total capital inflows, trade openness, change in private credit, current account balance and exchange rate flexibility.
One might worry however that the IT effect may be explained away by a combination of the other explanatory variables. While theory does not provide much guidance to which variables should belong to our specification, and there is a plausible risk of overparameterizing the model if we add a large subset of the variables at the same time to our small sample with 51 observations, Bayesian model averaging (BMA) provides a method for inferring the robustness of the IT effect. BMA bases statistical inference on averaging over all possible linear models, using the posterior model probabilities as weights. Estimates based on 200,000 burned iterations, 400,000 iterations, uniform prior over the space of models. For variable definitions, please refer the data appendix. Figure 14 presents the cumulative probability of inclusion for each of our explanatory variables. On the horizontal axis, it shows the best models from left to right, scaled by the Posterior Model Probability. The best model includes the inflation targeting dummy, and the pre-crisis ratios of short-term debt to GDP, reserves to short-term debt and gross public debt to GDP, all of which with the same sign as in Table 5 . The IT variable belongs to almost all probabilityweighted models (its posterior inclusion probability is over 97 percent) and it enters with a positive sign in all models where it is included with positive probability. Averaging all models based on their Bayesian probability weights, the posterior mean of the IT coefficient is about 2.6 percent (in the high end of the coefficients in Table 5 ).
In the next section, I try to determine the extent to which differences in monetary policy and exchange rate flexibility are behind the performance advantage of IT countries.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN MONETARY POLICY BETWEEN IT AND OTHER COUNTRIES
I am interested in the time-varying performance differences between IT and non-IT countries during the Great Recession. To capture these differences over time, I control for time fixed effects common to all countries, and individual country fixed effects through country fixed effects), therefore the regression I estimate is:
where y it is the dependent variable of interest,  i is a country specific effect t is a time-effect, and  it is a idiosyncratic shock. Our parameters of interest are in the sequence { t } of interactions between IT and time dummies. Because I want to focus on the effects of the financial crisis, I restrict the sample to a short period of time around the beginning of the full-blown crisis. For the variables observed monthly, the sample typically starts in January 2006; for the ones observed quarterly, our sample starts in 2002Q1. The failure of Lehman Brothers, which I take as the trigger for the crisis, happened in mid September 2008. Thus August 2008 is the time zero for our event study, i.e. the last period before the crisis gets into full motion. Equation (2) can be estimated with OLS regression, thereby estimating the time-varying mean IT effect, but for some of the variables where outliers are more influential (e.g. 12-month inflation, REER, EMBI spread, CDS spread), I use quantile regressions to estimate the median IT effect. Because the sample is restricted to not more than 51 countries, that is a small panel (23 IT and 28 not-IT countries) and the estimates may be sensitive to the exclusion of a few outliers.
I start by analyzing monetary policy responses, first through nominal policy interest rates, then through the resulting real policy rates; their impact on inflation, inflation expectations and real exchange rates. I also look at EMBI spreads and CDS premia in order to assess how markets evaluated IT countries relative to their counterparts.
A. Policy interest rates, in nominal terms
Inflation targeting countries reduced nominal policy interest rates more sharply than their peers. Table 9 shows that all the 5 countries with the largest cuts in nominal rates in 6-and 12-months after August 2008 were inflation targeters, while among the 5 countries that raised nominal rates or made the smallest reductions, only one inflation targeting country is included (Hungary, 6 months after the crisis). From the beginning of 2008 to August 2008, policy rates were on an increasing path for both the median IT and non-IT countries, but slightly more so for IT countries (Figure 15 ). In the month of Lehman's failure, September 2008, 6 IT countries tightened their policy rates (Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Israel, Peru and Sweden). However, as the crisis deepened, the average IT country cut its policy rate by about 1½ percentage points more than the average non-IT country. This difference in interest rate setting between IT and non-IT countries is statistically significant and has persisted at least until September 2010 (Figure 15b ). 
B. Policy rates, in real terms
Inflation targeting countries lowered their real interest rates relative to their peers in the months subsequent to August 2008. That is true for real interest rates based on both backward-looking 12 month inflation and forward-looking Consensus Forecast next year inflation (Figure 16 ) . As a matter of fact, there is a very high correlation between changes on each of the measures of real interest rates and changes in the nominal interest rate. For forward-looking real interest rates, that correlation is over 0.7 for the six months after the crisis and over 0.8 for 12 months after the crisis. There is also a significant overlap between the list of top 5 countries in terms of large changes in nominal and real interest rates (Tables 9-10) .
In quantitative terms, the differences are economically significant. About one year after the crisis, IT countries have managed to lower real interest rates by about 1.5-2 percent more than other countries, and that is true for both forwardand backward-looking real interest rate measures (Figure 17 ). 
C. Inflation rates and 'deflation scares'
That inflation rates and expectations of inflation plunged by less for inflation targeting countries can be inferred from what we have just presented about the behavior of nominal and real interest rates.
While there is significant evidence that inflation above a certain threshold carries heavy welfare and growth costs, the welfare ranking of different (positive) low levels of inflation is a subject of disagreement in the profession (Benigno and Ricci 2010) . But since the analysis of Fisher (1933) , the perils of debt-deflation spirals are part of the shared knowledge of macroeconomists.
Looking first at actual inflation outcomes, price levels dropped across the board in the last two months of 2008: the average annualized monthly inflation rate was lower by 3.4 percent for IT countries, 2 percent for the others in December 2008 relative to August 2008; and both the median IT and non-IT country had negative monthly inflation in December 2008 (Figure 18,a) . However, the median 12 month inflation for IT countries was never lower than 1.5 percent, while it reached below zero for non-IT countries. I define a deflation scare as the event of three consecutive negative readings of the monthly inflation rate, so we can distinguish the countries that had only 1 or 2 consecutive readings of negative inflation (which may likely be inconsequential) from those where a sequence of negative inflation rates lasted one quarter (which arguably raises the risk of a permanent downward revision of inflation expectations). On that front (n=51, of which 23 IT countries; data through August 2010), inflation targeting countries were less likely to suffer from a 'deflation scare' event during the Great Recession than their peers, with a statistically significant difference for 2008M12-2009M1 and 2009M6 (Figure 18,b) . This result is driven by differences in the prevalence of deflation scare among advanced economies as deflation scares were relatively less common among emerging economies, regardless of their monetary policy framework.
If anything, the evidence on Consensus Forecasts and actual inflation rates is consistent with IT countries being better able to anchor inflation than their peers during the Great Recession.
D. Real exchange rates
Having established thus far that IT countries seem to have on average better dodged the deflation bullet and been able to lower nominal and real interest rates by more than non-IT countries, I examine whether movements in their real exchange rates were in the direction towards injecting external demand when that was most needed. There were wide differences in the post-crisis path of real exchange rates for inflation targeting countries and their peers. The real effective exchange rate (REER, n=51, of which 23 IT countries; data through August 2010) of IT countries depreciated sharply in relation to other countries with the onset of the global crisis.
Taking August 2008 as a base period, the median IT currency depreciated by about 12½ percentage points by the first quarter of 2009 before it bounced back through the rest of that year, and now is at about the same level then they were at the outset of the crisis (Figure 19 ). Throughout that same period, the average non-IT currency remained broadly at the same level as in August 2008. This finding of sharp real depreciation of IT currencies after the crisis unfolded, followed by some appreciation towards pre-crisis levels, is valid for the full sample of 51 countries but it is also robust to including only the subset of 18 emerging markets, and to excluding countries with pegs or heavily managed floats against the U.S. dollar before the crisis. As striking as this finding may seem, these results are no artifact of sample choice or driven by outliers. In our sample of 51 countries, of which 23 are IT countries, the 10 countries with the largest real depreciations six months into the crisis (February 2009) were all IT countries (starting from the largest real depreciations, those are: Poland, with -31½ percent, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Australia, Brazil, Hungary, New Zealand, Indonesia, Sweden, and Turkey, with -16½ percent). The flip side of the concentration of IT countries among the ones with large real depreciations is the absence of IT countries among the top 6 countries with real appreciations during that period (e.g. Japan appreciated by 26½ percent, and Venezuela by 26 percent).
E. Measures of risk premia: EMBI and CDS spreads
While real depreciations during a crisis may be a desirable demand-switching mechanism from the national point of view, it may be of little help if accompanied by disruption of confidence, widening of risk spreads or a negative market reassessment of sovereign default. Whether that was the case is an empirical issue. It can be gauged by the behavior of the market assessment of risk premia, as proxied by the EMBI spread, and the premia on sovereigns' credit default swaps. For the balanced panel of emerging market countries for which I have EMBI spread data for the period of analysis (n=18, of which 12 IT countries, with data through October 2010), the evidence suggests that the real exchange rate depreciation for IT countries was not primarily driven or accompanied by a relative increase in risk perception of those countries (Figure 20) . The top panel presents median EMBI spreads for both groups of countries (using means instead would further exacerbate the spike in late 2008 for non-IT countries). For both groups of countries, EMBI spreads rose sharply at the outset of the crisis, but increases for non-IT countries were sharper -for instance the spreads for Argentina, Ukraine and Venezuela, all of them non-IT countries, increased by more than 1,000 basis points at their peak relative to August 2008. However, the differences are not statistically significant when we use block bootstrapping to build confidence intervals. The 5-year sovereign CDS spreads (n= 46, of which 22 IT countries, through September 2010) are also a gauge for financial markets sentiment about countries, with the advantage of a sample coverage that also extends to most advanced economies. In the months before the crisis, both median and average CDS spreads for IT countries were higher than for non-IT ones. In October 2008, CDS spreads increased across the board, but more so for non-IT countries. By November 2008, the average spread for IT countries had improved by more than 200 basis point relative to non-IT ones. The relative improvement in CDS spreads of IT countries was, however, temporary. Since the second half of 2009, block bootstrap confidence intervals for the time-varying IT effect has included zero ( Figure 21 ).
Taking the evidence on EMBI and CDS spreads together, there is a strong case that real exchange rate depreciation in IT countries was not accompanied by a relative deterioration of market sentiment.
Conclusion
With two years of data since the onset of the financial crisis, the evidence on the performance of inflation-targeting countries has been flattering as IT countries suffered smaller decelerations in growth than their peers. In attempting to explain this finding, I confirmed that this effect is robust to inclusion of plausible precrisis determinants of post-crisis performance, such as growth in private credit, ratios of short-term debt to GDP, reserves to short-term debt and reserves to GDP, capital account restrictions, total capital inflows, trade openness, current account balance and exchange rate flexibility, or post-crisis drivers such as the growth performance of trading partners and changes in terms of trade.
The finding of a positive IT effect is also confirmed by Bayesian model averaging. In an exercise of Bayesian model averaging based on an uninformative prior, the IT variable receives a very high posterior probability of inclusion; and if included, the support of its probability distribution is positive and bounded away from zero.
Other differences emerged between inflation targeting and other countries, and therein lie some hints on why IT countries outperformed their peers. Inflation targeting countries were able to lower nominal and real policy rates by more and were more likely to dodge the deflation bullet than their peers. With their flexible exchange rate regimes, IT currencies suffered sharp real depreciations which were not associated with a greater perception of risk by markets and may have helped switch demand towards their domestic goods and exports.
While the task of establishing causal relationships from cross-sectional macroeconomics series is daunting, our reading of this evidence is consistent with the resilience of IT countries being related to their ability to loosen their monetary policy when most needed, thereby avoiding deflation scares and the zero lower bound on interest rates.
Further research should determine the degree of permanence of this advantage, and explore the extent to which IT outperformance was a matter of luck, driven by superior monetary policy, or some omitted factor not considered in this paper. Industrial production (n=50, of which 23 IT countries; data through May 2010) data comes from IFS or Haver. The only country without data on industrial production is China, P.R.: Mainland. Countries for which quarterly data was linearly interpolated to obtain monthly figures are Australia, China: Hong Kong, New Zealand and Switzerland. 
